Quill has DoS via unbounded read of HTTP response body during notarization

Impact

Quill before version v0.7.1 has unbounded reads of HTTP response bodies during the Apple notarization process. Exploitation requires the ability to modify API responses from Apple's notarization service, which is not possible under standard network conditions due to HTTPS with proper TLS certificate validation; however, environments with TLS-intercepting proxies (common in corporate networks), compromised certificate authorities, or other trust boundary violations are at risk.

When processing HTTP responses during notarization, Quill reads the entire response body into memory without any size limit. An attacker who can control or modify the response content can return an arbitrarily large payload, causing the Quill client to run out of memory and crash. The impact is limited to availability; there is no effect on confidentiality or integrity. Both the Quill CLI and library are affected when used to perform notarization operations.

Patches

Fixed in Quill version v0.7.1

Workarounds

None

Credit

Anchore would like to thank opera-aklajn (Opera) for reporting this vulnerability

Resources

• Apple Get Submission Log API Documentation