angular/angular-cli · Security

Protocol-Relative URL Injection via Single Backslash Bypass in Angular SSR

GHSA ID
GHSA-vfx2-hv2g-xj5f
CVE ID
CVE-2026-33397
Severity
medium
Published
Updated
CVSS
6.1 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
CVSS v3
6.1 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
CVSS v4
6.9 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N

Description

An Open Redirect vulnerability exists in @angular/ssr due to an incomplete fix for CVE-2026-27738. While the original fix successfully blocked multiple leading slashes (e.g., ///), the internal validation logic fails to account for a single backslash (\) bypass.

When an Angular SSR application is deployed behind a proxy that passes the X-Forwarded-Prefix header:

  • An attacker provides a value starting with a single backslash (e.g., \evil.com).
  • The internal validation failed to flag the single backslash as invalid.
  • The application prepends a leading forward slash, resulting in a Location header containing /\evil.com.
  • Modern browsers interpret the /\ sequence as //, treating it as a protocol-relative URL and redirecting the user to the attacker-controlled domain.

Furthermore, the response lacks the Vary: X-Forwarded-Prefix header, allowing the malicious redirect to be stored in intermediate caches (Web Cache Poisoning).

Impact

This vulnerability allows attackers to conduct large-scale phishing and SEO hijacking:

  • Scale: A single request can poison a high-traffic route, impacting all users until the cache expires.
  • SEO Poisoning: Search engine crawlers may follow and index these malicious redirects, causing the legitimate site to be delisted or associated with malicious domains.
  • Trust: Because the initial URL belongs to the trusted domain, users and security tools are less likely to flag the redirect as malicious.

Patches

  • 22.0.0-next.2
  • 21.2.3
  • 20.3.21

Workarounds

Until the patch is applied, developers should sanitize the X-Forwarded-Prefix header in their server.ts before the Angular engine processes the request:

app.use((req, res, next) => {
  const prefix = req.headers['x-forwarded-prefix'];
  if (typeof prefix === 'string') {
    // Sanitize by removing all leading forward and backward slashes
    req.headers['x-forwarded-prefix'] = prefix.trim().replace(/^[/\\]+/, '/');
  }
  next();
});

References

CWEs

References