authorizerdev/authorizer · Security
Authorizer: CQL/N1QL Injection in Cassandra and Couchbase Backends via fmt.Sprintf String Interpolation
- GHSA ID
- GHSA-jfwg-rxf3-p7r9
- Severity
- high
- Published
- Updated
- CVSS
- 7.3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L
- CVSS v3
- 7.3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L
Description
Vulnerability Details
CWE: CWE-943 - Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Data Query Logic
All 66+ CQL queries in internal/storage/db/cassandradb/ use fmt.Sprintf to interpolate user-controlled values directly into CQL query strings without parameterization.
Unauthenticated endpoints (signup, login, forgot_password, magic_link_login) pass user input directly into CQL query strings.
Note: This advisory covers the Cassandra CQL injection only. The Couchbase N1QL injection is tracked in a separate advisory per CVE rule 4.2.11.
Affected Code Pattern
// Before (VULNERABLE) - e.g. cassandradb/user.go
query := fmt.Sprintf("SELECT ... FROM %s WHERE email = '%s'", table, email)
err := p.db.Query(query).Scan(...)
Steps to Reproduce
- Deploy Authorizer <= 2.0.0 with Cassandra backend
- Send a signup request with a CQL injection payload in the email field:
curl -X POST http://localhost:8080/graphql \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"query":"mutation { signup(params: { email: \"test'\" }) { message } }"}'
- The single quote breaks out of the CQL string literal, causing a CQL parse error that leaks internal schema information
- Crafted payloads can manipulate query logic to bypass authentication or extract data
Affected Files (10 Cassandra files)
| Package | File | Queries Fixed |
|---|---|---|
| cassandradb | user.go | 7 |
| cassandradb | otp.go | 4 |
| cassandradb | session_token.go | 19 |
| cassandradb | verification_requests.go | 4 |
| cassandradb | authenticator.go | 3 |
| cassandradb | email_template.go | 5 |
| cassandradb | webhook.go | 5 |
| cassandradb | webhook_log.go | 2 |
| cassandradb | session.go | 1 |
| cassandradb | env.go | 2 |
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker can inject arbitrary CQL operators through the email, phone, or token parameters on public-facing endpoints (signup, login, forgot_password, magic_link_login). This enables authentication bypass and data exfiltration from the Cassandra keyspace.
Proposed Fix
Use parameterized queries:
// After (FIXED)
query := fmt.Sprintf("SELECT ... FROM %s WHERE email = ?", table)
err := p.db.Query(query, email).Scan(...)
Fixed in https://github.com/authorizerdev/authorizer/pull/500 (merged 2026-03-27).
CWEs
- CWE-209 · Generation of Error Message Containing Sensitive Information
- CWE-943 · Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Data Query Logic
References
- https://github.com/authorizerdev/authorizer/security/advisories/GHSA-jfwg-rxf3-p7r9 ↗
- https://github.com/authorizerdev/authorizer/pull/500 ↗
- https://github.com/authorizerdev/authorizer/commit/73679faa53cd215c7524d651046e402c43809786 ↗
- https://github.com/authorizerdev/authorizer/releases/tag/2.0.1 ↗
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-jfwg-rxf3-p7r9 ↗