emilstenstrom/justhtml · Security
JustHTML has a Sanitizer Bypass (in Markdown)
- GHSA ID
- GHSA-3rcm-vjrc-p45j
- Severity
- medium
- Published
- Updated
- CVSS v4
- 5.3 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N
Description
Summary
to_markdown() does not sufficiently escape text content that looks like HTML. As a result, untrusted input that is safe in to_html() can become raw HTML in Markdown output.
This is not specific to tokenizer raw-text states like <title>, <noscript>, or <plaintext>, although those states can trigger the behavior. The root cause is broader: Markdown text serialization leaves angle brackets unescaped in text nodes.
Details
When converting a parsed document to Markdown, text nodes are escaped for a small set of Markdown metacharacters, but HTML-significant characters such as < and > are preserved. That means content parsed as text, including entity-decoded text or text produced by RCDATA/RAWTEXT-style parsing, can be emitted into Markdown as raw HTML.
Examples of affected input include:
- Text produced from entity-decoded input such as
<script>...</script> - Text inside elements like
<title>,<textarea>,<noscript>(when parsed as raw text), and<plaintext>
This is distinct from actual <script> or <style> elements in the DOM. Those are already dropped by default in to_markdown() unless html_passthrough=True.
Proof of Concept
General case
from justhtml import JustHTML
doc = JustHTML("<p><img src=x onerror=alert(1)></p>", fragment=True)
print(doc.to_html())
print()
print(doc.to_markdown())
CWEs
- CWE-79 · Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')