@hapi/wreck leaks sensitive `Proxy-Authorization` header across cross-hostname redirects

Impact

When @hapi/wreck follows a 3xx redirect to a different hostname, only the Authorization and Cookie headers are stripped. The standard credential header Proxy-Authorization is forwarded intact to the redirect target, potentially exposing forward-proxy credentials to a host outside the original trust boundary.

Redirect following is opt-in. The redirects option defaults to false (no redirections followed), so applications are only affected if they have explicitly set redirects to a positive integer on the request or via Wreck.defaults({ redirects: ... }).

Patches

@hapi/wreck 18.1.1 extends the cross-hostname strip set to include proxy-authorization. Upgrade to 18.1.1 or later.

Workarounds

If upgrading is not immediately possible:

• Leave redirects at its default (false) — applications that never enable redirect following are not affected.
• If redirects are required, set redirects: 0 when calling endpoints with sensitive headers, or strip Proxy-Authorization from the headers before issuing the request.
• Use the beforeRedirect hook to manually strip proxy-authorization (and any other sensitive application headers) when redirectOptions targets a different hostname than the original request.

Resources

• Related: CVE-2024-30260 / GHSA-3787-6prv-h9w3 (undici)
• RFC 7235 §4.4 — Proxy-Authorization