RabbitMQ Java client: Unvalidated Class.forName in JSON-RPC ProcedureDescription enables arbitrary class loading

The JSON-RPC tools in com.rabbitmq.tools.jsonrpc perform Class.forName(javaReturnType) with initialize=true on class names received from untrusted AMQP messages, without any validation or allowlist.

Vulnerable code (ProcedureDescription.java:101-127): When a JsonRpcClient connects, it calls system.describe and receives a service description from the AMQP queue. The response JSON includes javaReturnType fields that are reflectively set via JSONUtil.tryFill(), triggering setJavaReturnType() → computeReturnTypeAsJavaClass() → Class.forName(javaReturnType).

Attack scenario:

1. Victim uses JsonRpcClient to connect to a JSON-RPC service via RabbitMQ
2. Attacker (co-tenant on shared broker, or MITM) intercepts the system.describe request
3. Attacker responds with crafted javaReturnType values
4. Victim's client calls Class.forName(attackerInput) with default initialize=true
5. Static initializers of attacker-specified classes execute in victim's JVM

Additionally, the loaded class from getReturnType() is passed to mapper.parse(replyStr, expectedType) at JsonRpcClient.java:168, potentially enabling type-confusion.

Recommended fix: Use Class.forName(javaReturnType, false, classLoader) to prevent static initializer execution, or add an allowlist of permitted return types.

CWE: CWE-470

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Reply from reporter (2026-06-29): Thanks for the quick turnaround. Fix looks good. Looking forward to the CVE assignment.