sammyjdev/axon · Security

Axon: Download of Code Without Integrity Check in axon-mcp

GHSA ID
GHSA-r7wg-f7r2-8wf7
CVE ID
CVE-2026-76818
Severity
high
Published
Updated
CVSS
7.5 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
CVSS v3
7.5 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Description

Summary

axon rtk-install downloads a pre-built rtkx binary from GitHub releases and executes it via subprocess.run() on every text-compression call, without verifying its integrity — no checksum, signature, or attestation check anywhere in the download/install path. If the release pipeline or a maintainer token for sammyjdev/rtkx were ever compromised, every axon user who installs or auto-bootstraps rtkx would silently download and execute an unverified binary with the same privileges as the axon process.

Details

The download path lives in src/axon/context/rtk_bootstrap.py:

  • _http_download() fetches the release archive over HTTPS via urllib.request.urlopen() and writes the raw response bytes to disk — no hash comparison against any published value.
  • _extract_binary() unpacks the archive (zip/tar.gz) and sets the executable bit (out.chmod(... S_IXUSR | S_IXGRP | S_IXOTH)), again with no verification step.
  • There is no reference to checksum, sha256, verify, signature, gpg, cosign, or sigstore anywhere in this file.

The binary is not dead code — it's on the active execution path. src/axon/context/rtk.py::rtk_binary_path() resolves to the bootstrapped binary at ~/.axon/bin/rtkx, and compress_text_with_rtk() invokes it directly:

result = subprocess.run( [path, "read", str(tmp_path)], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=timeout_seconds, )

PoC

This is a missing-control finding rather than an active exploit, so reproduction is by code audit rather than a live payload:

Clone sammyjdev/axon and open src/axon/context/rtk_bootstrap.py. Confirm _http_download() and _extract_binary() perform no hash/signature check before chmod +x. Trace the call chain: bootstrap_rtkx() → _http_download() → _extract_binary() → rtk_binary_path() (in rtk.py) → subprocess.run() in compress_text_with_rtk(). Optionally demonstrate impact safely: point download_url() / the download callable (already injectable per the module's own docstring, "the download step is injectable so the extraction logic is testable offline") at a local HTTP server serving an attacker-controlled archive, and confirm it gets extracted, chmod +x'd, and executed with no rejection.

Impact

Type: CWE-494 (Download of Code Without Integrity Check), leading to potential arbitrary code execution. Who's affected: Any axon user who runs axon rtk-install or triggers auto-bootstrap, if sammyjdev/rtkx's release pipeline or a maintainer's release credentials are ever compromised. Not exploitable today without that precondition, but the missing control removes the last line of defense against a supply-chain compromise of the binary dependency.

CWEs

References