vercel/next.js · Security
Next.js's Middleware / Proxy redirects can be cache-poisoned
- GHSA ID
- GHSA-3g8h-86w9-wvmq
- CVE ID
- CVE-2026-44572
- Severity
- low
- Published
- Updated
- CVSS
- 3.7 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
- CVSS v3
- 3.7 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
Description
Impact
Next.js uses the x-nextjs-data request header for internal data requests. On affected versions, an external client could send this header on a normal request to a path handled by middleware that returns a redirect.
When that happened, the middleware/proxy could treat the request as a data request and replace the standard Location redirect header with the internal x-nextjs-redirect header. Browsers do not follow x-nextjs-redirect, so the response became an unusable redirect for normal clients.
If the application was deployed behind a CDN or reverse proxy that caches 3xx responses without varying on this header, a single attacker request could poison the cached redirect response for the affected path. Subsequent visitors could then receive a cached redirect response without a Location header, causing a denial of service for that redirect path until the cache entry expired or was purged.
Affected scenarios
This affects applications that:
- use middleware or proxy redirects
- are deployed behind a caching CDN or reverse proxy
- allow 3xx responses on those paths to be cached without differentiating internal data requests from normal requests
Fix
The fix stops trusting x-nextjs-data by itself for middleware redirect handling. A request is now treated as an internal data request only when it is validated as such by internal routing state, preserving legitimate data-request redirect behavior while preventing external header injection from changing normal redirect responses.
Workarounds
Before upgrading, users can reduce risk by:
- configuring the CDN or reverse proxy to vary its cache key on
x-nextjs-datafor affected responses
CWEs
- CWE-349 · Acceptance of Extraneous Untrusted Data With Trusted Data